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Abstract
In this paper I extend Matthew Rabin￿ s model of fairness equilibria
(1993) to groups of individuals. This allow me to introduce three aspects
from reality that are absent in game theory: i) individuals discriminate in
favor of members of their own groups, ii) individuals like individuals that
not only are kind to them, but are kind to other individuals, specially
individuals of their own groups, and iii) individuals discrimate in favor
of members of groups they like. I de￿ne a new equilibrium that takes
in consideration this emotions, what I call group fairness equilibrium.
Rabin de￿nes the mutual-max outcomes for a single game as outcomes
where each player maximize the other player￿ s material mayo⁄s and the
mutual-min outcomes as outcomes where each player minimize the other
player￿ s material payo⁄s. Some basic results of my model are that a
combination of strict Nash equilibrium in several games, will always be a
group fairness equibrium for large values of the material payo⁄s, and that
any outcome that is either strictly mutual-max for both games or strictly
mutual-min for both games is a group fairness equilibrium for large values
of the material payo⁄s.Group Fairness and Game Theory
Alejandro T. Moreno
1 Introduction
Most economic models assume that individuals focus exclusively in the material
gains and that individuals do not care about the groups of the players they
are interacting with. However, when we interact with other individuals, we
care about the groups they belong, generally treating better those individuals
that belong to our own group.1 We treat better somebody if he or she is our
relative, countryman, if he cheers for the same team and even if he is assigned
to a group with us randomly.2 For example, if an individual plays the prisoners
dilemma with a player that do not have any relation to him or if he plays it
with somebody that belongs to a close group, as his family, he would treat them
di⁄erently. In most situations we would expect a player to be kinder to a relative
than somebody that does not have any relation with him.
Individuals also care if the individuals they are interacting with are kind or
unkind. In his seminal paper, Rabin (1993) introduces fairness to game theory
by modelling how individuals want to be kind to other individuals that are kind
to them, and be unkind to other individuals that are unkind to them. Rabin
shows how in the Prisoners Dilemma the desire to be kind to an individual that
has been kind to us makes possible an equilibrium (Rabin de￿nes it as fairness
equilibrium) where both players play cooperate.
However, when individuals assess how kind other individuals are, they not
only care about how kind they are with themselves, but also how kind they are
with other individuals, specially with other individual they care. For example,
if two members of the same family, a father and a son, play a prisoners￿dilemma
in two games with another player, it is reasonable to think that the father would
be kinder to the player if the player is kind to his son, and the father would be
unkinder to the player if the player is unkind to his son.
1See Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, Chapter 25 from the Handbook of Social
Psychology by Susan T. Fiske.
2See George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton in Economics and Identity. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2000.
2And individuals sometimes are kind to members of a group they like and
individuals sometime are unkind to members of a group they dislike. Individ-
uals sometimes like a group if somebody from that group has helped them or
other members of their own group and individuals sometimes dislike a group if
somebody from that group has treated them, or to other member of their own
group, badly.
For example, if members from one family are playing against members from
another family, let￿ s say the sons play against each other in a game and the
fathers play against each other in another game, it is reasonable to think that
the father not only cares about how the other father treats him, but he also
cares how the son of the other family treats his own son. If one son is kind to
the other son, the father of the other son may be want to be kinder to the other
member of that family in return.
We can see from the examples above that individuals form emotions of fair-
ness between groups, and this is not an insigni￿cant phenomena. In interethnic
con￿ icts, individuals from each group are targeted in order to retaliate for the
attacks perpetrated by members from their groups, even if the individuals that
are targeted are not related to previous attacks. And individuals sometimes buy
products at a higher price or of subpar quality if the owners of the ￿rms that
produce the products are from the same country as them.
In this paper I formulate a model that introduces to game theory what I call
group fairness, that is, the emotions of fairness and reciprocity over the treat-
ment of members of the same group. I do this by extending the model developed
by Matthew Rabin (1993) of fairness equilibria to groups of individuals.
My model incorporates three observations of individuals￿interaction:
1) Individuals discriminate in favor of individuals of the same group.
2) Individuals are willing to sacri￿ce their own material well-being to help
those that not only help them but help others and punish those who not only
are unkind to them but that are unkind to others.
3) Individuals are willing to sacri￿ce thier own material well-being to help
members of a group they like and punish those that belong to a group they
dislike. I assume that individuals like a group if somebody from that group
has helped them or other members of their own group and individuals dislike
3a group if somebody from that group has treated them, or to other member of
their own group, badly.
In section 2 I introduce my model. I start by reviewing Matthew Rabin￿ s
model of fairness equilibrium and then extending it to groups of individuals.
Rabin￿ s model is de￿ned over a single game of two players, however, in order
to analyze interaction between groups of individuals, I have to work with more
games. I model the easiest case: two games of two individuals each game.
Some basic results of my model are the following: a) a combination of strict
Nash equilibrium in both games will always be a group fairness equibrium for
large values of the material payo⁄s; b) any outcome that is either strictly mutual-
max for both games or strictly mutual-min for both games, is a group fairness
equilibrium for large values of the material payo⁄s, and c) if one of the games
has a strict Nash equilibrium that is a mutual-max outcome, then, when the
material payo⁄s of the game grow arbitrarily large, the fairness equilibrium of
the single game is neutral and the group fairness of the whole game will be
de￿ned by the other game; if one game does not have mutual-max outcome,
then, as the material payo⁄s of that game grow arbitrarily large, the whole
game has a weakly negative group fairness equilibrium.
In section 3 I analyze the sequential case where one game is played ￿rst and
then the other. This allows me to model how players in the ￿rst game may try
to in￿ uence the emotions of players in the second game by being kind or unkind
themselves.
In section 4 I introduce another emotion into my model: individuals dislike
to being discriminated against. Although for some groups as family, it is seen
naturally that individuals treat better those members of their own group, for
some groups as race and gender, individuals dislike to be discriminated.
In section 5 I apply my model to the example of a monopoly that gives a
product for free to an individual in need to improve its image to its consumers.
By improving its image, the monopoly is able to charge consumers a higher
price, as individuals are kinder to the monopoly.
I concludeand discuss possible extensions in section 6.
42 Model
2.1 Review of Matthew Rabin￿ s Fairness Equilibrium
Matthew Rabin (1993) introduces fairness to game theory by modeling how if
one player, let￿ s say player 1, believes that another player, let￿ s say player 2,
is sacri￿cing his own material payo⁄s to help him, then player 1 may want to
sacri￿ce his own material payo⁄s as well in order to help player 2; and if player
1 believes that player 2 is treating him badly, he may sacri￿ce his own material
payo⁄ to treat him badly in return.
Rabin models a two players game, where Si is set of possible actions for
individual i; ai are individual i0s actions, bj are individual i0s beliefs of the
actions of individual j and ci is what individual i believes are individual j0s
beliefs of the actions of individual i: ￿i(ai;bj) are individual i0s material payo⁄s
given that he takes action ai and he believes individual j0s actions are bj: ￿e
j(bj)









i (bi) is individual i0s highest possible
payo⁄and ￿l
i(bj) is individual i0s lowest possible payo⁄from all possible Pareto
outcomes: ￿min
i (ci) is the lowest possible outcome.
Rabin models fairness between two individuals by de￿ning two functions: one
that represents how kind an individual is to the other individual and a second
that represent an individual￿ s beliefs about how kind the other individual is to













i (ci) ￿ ￿min
i (ci)
Rabin de￿nes a utility function that incorporates these kindness functions
to represent how an individual wants to be kind to an individual he believes is
being kind to him and wants to be mean to an individual he believes is mean
to him. The utility function is de￿ned as:
Ui(ai;bj;ci) = ￿i(ai;bj) + e fj(bj;ci)[1 + fi(ai;bj)]
5This model captures individuals￿desire to be kind to somebody that has
been kind to them and individuals￿desire to be unkind to somebody that has
been unkind to them. If individual i believes that individual j is kind to him
(the function e fj(bj;ci)) is positive, then he would increase his utility by being
kind in return (the funcion fi(ai;bj) would be positive). If individual i believes
that individual j is unkind to him (the function e fj(bj;ci)) is negative, then he
would increase his utility by being unkind in return (the funcion fi(ai;bj) would
be negative).
I objetive is to extend Rabin￿ s model to introduce some aspects from reality
that are absent from his analysis. First, it is easier for individuals to cooperate if
they belong to the same group, for example if they are relatives. Evidence from
social psychology shows that individuals tend to treat better those individuals
that belong to their own group, even if the group was formed randomly. Second,
individuals think that a person is kind not only if he is nice to them, but if he
is nice to other individuals. And third, individuals see themselves as part of
groups and they care about the animosity of one group toward the other. Rabin
models fairness only for two players. However, in order to analyze emotion of
group fairness, I extend Rabin￿ s concept of fairness to include more than two
players.
Although I model games where individuals play directly only in pairs, I
assume that individuals observe and take in consideration the interaction of
players in other games when they form their beliefs of kindness. While most
economists have assumed that players only care about what￿ s happen in the
games they play, my objective is to model how the outcome in one game may
a⁄ect the outcome in other games.
2.1.1 Some single game propositions
Before extending Rabin￿ s model to more players, I give some single game propo-
sitions that complement those of Rabin and that will help me with the proposi-
tions for the case of group fairness equilibrium for the next section. All proofs
are in the appendix.
Rabin de￿nes a mutual-max strategy as a strategy where both players mu-
tually maximize each other￿ s material payo⁄s and a mutual-min strategy as a
strategy where both players mutually minimize each other￿ s utility. Rabin also
6de￿nes the sign of the outcome of a game in funcion of the sign of the kindness
function of each player. I write his de￿nitions to use them in my propositions.
De￿nition 1: A strategy pair (a1;a2) 2 (S1;S2) is a mutual-max outcome if,
for i = 1;2; j 6= i; ai 2 argmaxa2Si ￿j(a;aj):
De￿nition 2: A strategy pair (a1;a2) 2 (S1;S2) is a mutual-min outcome if,
for i = 1;2; j 6= i; ai 2 argmin￿j(a;aj):
De￿nition 3: a) An outcome is strictly positive if for i = 1;2; fi > 0: b)
An outcome is weakly positive if for i = 1;2; fi ￿ 0: c) An outcome is strictly
negative if for i = 1;2; fi < 0: d) An outcome is weakly negative if for i = 1;2;
fi ￿ 0: e) An outcome is neutral if for i = 1;2; fi = 0: f) An outcome is mixed
if for i = 1;2; i 6= j;fifj < 0:
Proposition 1: For a single game, there is an X for which for all X > X
all fairness equilibria that remain in a game have to be Nash equilibria (not
necessarily strict).
Proposition 1 tell us that as the material payo⁄s increase arbitrarily, the
fairness equilibria of the game have to be also Nash equilibria. If individuals are
not playing a Nash equilibrium then there is at least one deviation for one player
that improves his material payo⁄s. As the material payo⁄s increase arbitrarily
large individuals care more about them and less about the fairness payo⁄s, until
the point that material considerations dominate the fairness consideration and
individual deviate.
Proposition 2: For a single game, there is a value X for which for all X > X,
there is not a positive fairness equilibrium. If a single game does not have a
mutual-max outcome, there is a value X for which for all X > X only exists
weakly negative fairness equilibrium.
Proposition 2 tell us that as the material payo⁄s grow arbitrarily large, the
positive fairness equilibria are eliminated and only the weakly negative fairness
equilibria are left. As the income increases, the material payo⁄s dominate the
fairness considerations. Because individuals are maximizing their own material
payo⁄s, other individuals would not think they are been kind and the positive
fairness is eliminated. The only possible equilibria are neutral or negative. The
7second part of proposition 2 refers to the fact that if the Nash equilibrium is not
a mutual-max outcome, then at least one individual is playing a strategy that
is not maximizing the other￿ s utility and therefore he is been strictly unkind
to him. The other individual would also be unkind to him (at least weakly),
making the equilibria weakly negative.
2.2 My model: 4 individuals and 2 games
I extend Rabin￿ s fairness to groups of individuals by analyzing the case of two
games with two players each game. The games are game 1 and game 2; and each
game has two players: player 1 and player 2. I will call player i that plays in
game m as player im; where i = 1;2 and m = 1;2: For example, player 1 from
game 1 will be player 11: The players are members of groups and some players
can belong to the same group. Let me give an assumption that will simplify the
notation: if there are two individuals from the same group, one in each game,
then both players will be players 1 from game 1 and 2 (player 11 and player 12)
or both players will be players 2 from game 1 and game 2 (21 and player 22):
Sim is the set of possible actions of individual im: aim 2 Sim are the actions
of the individual im; bim 2 Sim are the beliefs of the individual jm about the
actions of the individual im and cim 2 Sim are the beliefs of individual im about
the beliefs of the individual jm about his own actions (im￿ s actions): The last
two variables refer to the beliefs that individuals have about the actions and
beliefs of the individuals they are playing with. I introduce two new variables
that represent individual￿ s beliefs about the actions and beliefs of the individuals
that play in the other game. dim 2 Sim are the beliefs of the individual jn of
the actions of individual im and eim 2 Sim are the beliefs of individual in about
the beliefs of individual jm about the actions of player im:
Individuals sometimes belong to groups whose members are be very close to
each other, like members of the same family, and individuals sometimes belong
to groups whose members are not so close to each other. I de￿ne a variable v1
that represent if both individuals 1 (in game 1 and 2) belong to the same group
and if they do, how close the members of that group are. v2 represents if both
individuals 2 belong to the same group and if they do, how close the members
of that group are. vi is de￿ned from zero to one, where small values of vi; mean
that i1 and i2 belong to a group whose members are not very close while high
8values of vi mean that player i1 and player i2 belong to a group whose members
are close. At the extremes, if vi = 0, then player i1 and player i2 do not belong
to any common group and if vi = 1; then i1 and i2 are the same player. The
variable ￿1 represents if both players in game 1 belong to the same group, and
if they do, how close they are, and the variable ￿2 represents ib both players in
game 2 belong to the same group and if they do how close they are.
I de￿ne a function that represents how kind an individual is.














=2: This function is exactly the
same as Rabin￿ s kindness function, but the notation changes to take in consid-
eration that there are two games with two players each game. Now I de￿ne a
funtion that represents how an individual judges other individuals. I modify Ra-
bin￿ s function to take in consideration that individuals not only care about how
kind is the individual they are playing with, but how kind are other members
of the same group.















The function g fjm represents how individual im judges individual jm for his
actions and intentions with himself, with his actions and intentions with other
individuals, and for the actions and intentions of other members of his group.
The ￿rst two terms of the numerator and the denominator represent the
beliefs of an indivudal of what￿ s happen in his own game: These terms are the
equivalent of Rabin￿ s de￿nition for how kind an individual believes is another
individual. The last two terms of the numerator and the denominator represent
the beliefs of an individual of what￿ s happen in the other game:
By choosing to de￿ne g fjm as only one fraction I am representing that an
individual cares about the magnitud of kindness for each player. If the stakes
9of one game are higher than the other, then a player would be giving a higher
material payo⁄to the other player when kind, and therefore he would be thought
as much kinder person. In this case, then the two terms from that game will
grow with respect to the terms for the other game, and g fjm would represent
that an individual thinks much better of a person that is very kind than to
somebody that is only a shligtly kind.
I could have de￿ned g fjm as the sum of two fractions, one that represents the
beliefs of a player about how kind is the player he is playing with and other that
represents his beliefs about how kind is the other member of the group of the
player he is playing with: However, by normalyzing both terms before adding
them this function would represent that an individual do not care about the
magnitud of kindness or unkindness for each player, but only its sign.
The choice for g fjm is important, as some of my results depend on its form.
However I think my de￿nition of g fjm is more realistic this way.
The importance player im gives to what happen in game n depends on the
term (vj)(1=2 + vi=2): I include the term vj to represent that as the a¢ liation
between two player grow large, so it grows how other individuals relate their
actions and intentions. The term 1=2 + vi =2 represents that the person that is
making the judgement, in this case player im, cares more of the other game if
somebody close to him plays in that game. I add 1=2 because I want to represent
that even if an individual does not have anybody related to him in the other
game, he may still care on that game.
As the term (vj)(1=2+vi=2) becomes smaller, player im pays less attention
to what￿ s happen in the other game when he makes his judgement about player
jm: When (vj)(1=2 + vi=2) = 0; then player jm is not related to any player in
game n and individual im cannot use any information from game n to judge
him. In this case the equation g fjm reduces to the same equation used by Rabin.
Once I have completed the de￿nition of kindness and the belief of kindness
I can de￿ne an individual￿ s utility function:
Uim = ￿im + g fjm(1 + fim)
De￿nition 6: The strategies aim 2 Sim for all i;j 2 [1;2]; and m;n 2 [1;2];
where i 6= j and m 6= n are a Group Fairness Equilibrium if:
101) aim 2 argmaxaim2Sim Uim
2) aim = bim = cim = dim = eim
The model captures the observation that individuals treat better those indi-
viduals that belong to their own groups, by including a variable ￿m; where ￿m
is positive when player im and player jm belong to the same group, zero oth-
erwise. In this case, individuals would have a greater utility if they are kinder
to somebody from their same group, specially if they belong to a group whose
members are close.






Rabin shows that in the Prisoners Dilemma the cooperative outcome exists
for low values of x (x ￿ 1=4): In my model cooperation can be sustained for
higher values of x if both players belong to the same group, as in example
1, where father and son are faced each other. In the case that vm > 0; the
equilibrium where both players cooperate exists if x ￿ 1=4 + vm=2; that is,
individuals of the same group can cooperate for higher values of material payo⁄s.
Additionally, if vm > 1=2, the equilibrium where both players play defect does
not exists for low values of x (x < vm ￿1=2), that is, individuals that belong to
the same group will always cooperate for small material payo⁄s.
The model also captures the idea that individuals care not only about how
kind other individuals are to them, but how kind they are to other individuals.
As result, the outcomes of di⁄erent games for the same individual could be
related. If an individual is unkind to a second individual, a third individual














In example 2, the outcome in game 1 and game 2 are related. In the case
that vi (the relation between father and son) is close to one, the father would
think that player 2 is not very kind if player 2 plays defect with his son, even
if he plays cooperate with himself. In this case the outcomes would often be
(cooperate, cooperate) for both games or (defect, defect) for both games and
the equilibrium where player 2 and the father play cooperate and player 2 and
the son play defect does not exist but for small values of x:
My model also captures the idea that individuals may be kind to individuals
that belong to groups they like and treat badly individuals that belong to groups
they do not like. I assume that individuals form emotions of like or dislike for
a group depending how member of those groups have treated them or to other
members of their own groups. Also in this case, when members of two groups














In example 3, when vi and vj are close to one, if the father of player 1 plays
deviate with the father of player 2, then player 1 would not be very happy with
family 1 and would play deviate with player 2, for all but small values of x; even
if player 2 is kind and plays cooperate with him. In this example the equilibrium
12where in one of the games they play cooperate and in the other deviate does
not exists, but for small values of x.
Now I analyze if group fairness equilibrium makes possible outcomes that
are not possible with fairness equilibrium or other type of equilibrium. For
example, is it posible that a group fairness equilibrium exists where in the














In example 4, for values of vi and vj close to one, a groop fairness equilibrium
exists where in game 1 player 1 plays defect and player 2 plays cooperate and
where in game 2 the Father of player 1 plays cooperate and the Father of player
2 plays defect. Even if player 1 treats badly player 2, player 2 would still think
well overall of family 1, given that the father of player 1 is much more kind than
his son is unkind.
2.3 Basic Results
In this section I give some general propositions for the case of four players that
play two games, but before, I extend the de￿nition of positive and negative
outcomes for the case of two games.
De￿nition 5: a) An outcome is strictly positive for the case of two games
if for i = 1;2 and m = 1;2; fim > 0: b) An outcome is weakly positive if for
i = 1;2 and m = 1;2; fim ￿ 0: c) An outcome is strictly negative if for i = 1;2;
m = 1;2; fi < 0: d) An outcome is weakly negative if for i = 1;2; m = 1;2;
fi ￿ 0: e) An outcome is neutral if for i = 1;2; m = 1;2 fi = 0: f) An outcome
is mixed if for any i = 1;2; m = 1;2; where i 6= j or m 6= n; fimfjn < 0 :
13Proposition 3: If an outcome A is a combination of strict Nash equilibrium
in games 1 and 2, there is an X for which for all X > X A is a group fairness
equilibrium. If A is not a combination of Nash equilibrium of games 1 and 2,
there is an X for which for all X > X A is not a group fairness equilibrium.
Proposition 3 is a direct translation of Rabin￿ s proposition 5 to group fair-
ness. As the material payo⁄s increase, the importance of fairness considerations
becomes smaller. As the material payo⁄s increase arbitrarily, eventually the
material payo⁄s dominate fairness considerations and the group fairness equi-
librium are the combination of Nash equilibria for both games.
Proposition 4: There is a value X for which for all X > X, any game does
not have a positive group-fairness equilibria.
Proposition 4 tell us that as the material payo⁄s grow large, the positive
group fairness equilibria are eliminated and only the weakly negative and neutral
group fairness equilibria are left. As the income increases, the material payo⁄s
dominate the fairness considerations. Because individuals are maximizing their
own material payo⁄s, other individuals would not think their are been kind and
the positive fairness is eliminated.
Proposition 5: For any outcome that is either strictly mutual-max for both
games or strictly mutual-min for both games, there exists an X for which for
all X < X A is a group fairness equilibrium.
Proposition 5 is a direct translation of Rabin￿ s proposition 3. As material
payo⁄s approach to zero, the game is dominated by the fairness considerations.
In the case that an outcome that is strictly mutual-max for both games, every
player is playing a strategy that maximize the material payo⁄s of the other
players and therefore they are being kind to each other. In this case nobody
wants to change strategy since they want to be kind to each other in response.
In the case that an outcome that is strictly mutual-min for both games, every
player is playing a strategy that minimize the material payo⁄s of the other
players and therefore they are being unkind to each other. In this case nobody
wants to change strategy since they want to be unkind to each other in response.
Now I analyze the case where the material payo⁄s of one of the games change
while the other is left constant. I de￿ne the playo⁄s of game one as function of
14x and the payo⁄s of game two as a function of y as in ￿gure 6. I analyze the
case where y changes, but x keeps constant. I will assume in these propositions















Proposition 6: If game two has a strict Nash equilibrium that is a mutual-
max outcome, then there is a Y for which for all Y > Y the sign of the group
fairness equilibrium is the sign of the fairness equilibrium of game 1. If game
two does not have any mutual-max outcome, there is a value Y for which for
all Y > Y the whole game has a weakly negative group fairness equilibrium.
Proposition 6 tell us that in the case that game two has a strict Nash equi-
libria that are mutual-max, then the fairness equilibrium of game two is neutral,
because each individual is playing the action that maximizes his own material
payo⁄s, so the other player sees his action as neutral, and the group fairness of
the whole game will be de￿ned by the other game. In the case that the Nash
equilibria are not mutual-max, as the material payo⁄s grow large the equilib-
rium of the game becomes weakly negative. Because the material payo⁄s of
that game become large its fairness considerations tend to dominate those of
the whole game. In example 6, as Y grows large, the only fairness equilibrium
that exists is defect, defect that is strictly negative. As Y grows arbitrarily large,
the material payo⁄s of game two are going to dominate the material payo⁄s of
game one and eliminate any positive or neutral equilibrium.
Proposition 7: If game 1 does not have a mutual-max outcome, then as
Y ! 0 individuals in game 2 are kind to each other only if individuals in game
151 are kind to each other and individuals in game 2 are unkind to each other if
player in game 1 are unkind to each other.
Proposition 7 tell us that as the material payo⁄s of one game become arbi-
trarily small, their importance on group fairness is going to be reduced until the
fairness considerations of the other game dominate the group fairness. In exam-
ple 6, as X becomes small, individuals in game one cooperate only if individuals
in game 2 also cooperate and they defect if individuals in game 2 defect.
3 Two period games
In this section I analyze the case where both games are played sequentially: one
game is played ￿rst and then the other. I assume that players in the second
game observe the outcome of the ￿rst game before they play. If players in the
￿rst game know that their actions can a⁄ect the outcome in game two, they
may play di⁄erently in order to change the actions of the players of the second
game. For example, if two sons and two fathers from two di⁄erent families are
playing with each other, we can think that both fathers will be nice in order to
have good relations between both families and help their sons to be nice to each
other.
Other than assuming that game 1 is played ￿rst and game 2 is played second
I assume that there are no di⁄erences with respect to the case where both games
are played simultaneosly and individuals utilities are the same. By keeping the
same utility functions I am implicitly assuming that individuals in the second
game do not take in consideration that individuals in the ￿rst period may be
kind or unkind in order to in￿ uence their decisions in the second period. The
di⁄erence of this case with the sequential games analyzed by Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) is that in my model the simple structure of the game allow
me to solve these games by backward induction.
Let h be a non terminal history that takes us to a subgame, where h 2 HnZ,
H is the set of possible histories and Z is the set of terminal histories, aim(h)
be a strategy for player im at history h:
De￿nition 6: The strategies aim(h) 2 Sim(h) for all i;j 2 [1;2]; and m;n 2
[1;2]; where i 6= j and m 6= n; are a Sequential Group Fairness Equilibrium if,
for every non terminal history h 2 HnZ we have:
161) aim(h) 2 argmaxaim(h)2Sim(h) Uim
2) aim = bim = cim = dim = eim
4 Discrimination
Individuals see themselves as part of groups and they care if they are discrimi-
nated for belonging to those groups. In some groups, as it is the case of families,
it is seen naturally that individuals treat better to the members of their own
group. However, individuals do not like to be discriminated based on some
groups, as race and ethnicity. In this section I include the emotion of disliking







In example 4, if player one goes to the Opera, he would be angry if he believes
that player two is going to Boxing in order to be unkind to him, however he
would be even angrier if he believes that player two is unkind to him because of
the group he belongs. That is, the belief of discrimination increases individuals
sense of unfairness.
I assume that individuals have beliefs about what would other players would
have played if they had belonged to their same group. If individual 1 believes
that individual 2 would have treated him better if he were from the same group,
he would feel discriminated and this would increase his sense of unfairness.
I de￿ne gjm as individual i0s beliefs about individual j￿ s hypothetical actions
if i have been of the same group as j: For simplicity I de￿ne individual￿ s dislike
for being discriminated for the case of a single game between two players (from
di⁄erent groups), although the model can easily be extended for several games.
De￿nition 7: Player i0s belief about how kind is player j:
e fj(bj;ci;gj) ￿
￿i(ci;bj) ￿ ￿e
i(ci) + ￿i(ci;bj) ￿ ￿i(ci;gj)
￿h
i (ci) ￿ ￿min
i (ci)
(2)
The last two terms of the numerator of equation 2 represent how much
individuals detest to be discriminated.
17De￿nition 8: The strategies aij for all i 2 N; where i 6= j are a Group
Fairness Equilibrium if:
The strategies ai 2 Si for all i;j 2 [1;2]; where i 6= j are a Discrimination
Fairness Equilibrium if:
1) ai 2 argmaxai2Si Ui
2) ai = bi = ci = gj
In example 5, for values of x ￿ 2; there is an equilibrium where both players
play the same action if they are from the same group, but they play di⁄erent
outcomes if they are from di⁄erent groups. In this case e fj ￿ ￿2; given that
individuals resent being treated di⁄erent because the group they belong. In the
case of Rabin￿ s fairness equilibria, the maximum value of x for which individuals
are unkind to each other is one. This means that an emotion of dislike for being
discriminated increases the range for which a negative outcome is possible.
5 Application: Firms giving to Charity
Rabin shows that when individuals care about fairness, a monopoly cannot ex-
tract all consumer￿ s surplus, given that individuals see this as an unfair practice
and retaliate by not buying its product. However, if consumers care not only
about how the monopoly treats them, but how it treats other individuals, a
monopoly could improve its public image by being kind to a group of individu-
als in need or a charity.
Rabin solves an example wher a consumer wants to buy one unit of a product
from a monopoly. The consumer￿ s valuation of the product is given by ￿, while
the marginal cost for the monopoly is given by c. Simultaneosly, the monopoly
chooses the price and the consumer chooses a reservation price r; above which he
is not willing to pay. If the monopoly prices at p = r = z (charging the highest
price the consumer is willing to pay), the consumer￿ s belief in the fairness of the




As long as the monopoly is pricing above its marginal cost, this function
is always negative. This is because the monopolist is choosing the price that
extracts as much surplus as possible from the consumer, given the consumer￿ s
18refusal to buy at a price higher than z. This means that the consumer will
always see a price higher than the cost of the product as an unfair practice from
the monopoly and would prefer to retaliate (by not buying) if his material gains
from buying the product are too low. This forces the monopoly to reduce its
price below v:
If the monopoly can improve how kind the consumer think it is, then the
monopoly would be able to charge a higher price to the consumer without being
retaliated. In my model the monopoly can acomplish this by being kind to
another player, let￿ s say an individual that is in need of its product, but does
not have the resources to pay for it.
I extend Rabin￿ s example by adding a another game in which the monopoly
can improve its image by giving its product for free to this individual in need.
Let￿ s say that the player in need values the product at x and cannot pay any
price for it. With respect to this consumer, the monopoly has two options,
give him the product for free or not. If the monopoly gives the product for
free to the individual in need, it incurs in a cost of c, but the consumer would
think better of it, and if the monopoly does not give the product for free to the
individual in need, the consumer would think worst of it. For example, people
thought that it was unfair that pharmaceutical companies did not provide cheap
drugs to people with aids in Africa. After a public backlash, the pharmaceutical
companies gave the drugs for free, improving their image.
In the ￿rst period the monopoly decides if it gives the product for free to
the individual in need and in the second period the monopoly sells its product
to the consumer. I solve the problem by backward induction. In the second
period, the consumer values the product at ￿ and chooses a reservation price
above which he is not willing to pay and the monopoly simultaneosly chooses
the price. If p > r; the consumer buys the product.
If the monopoly gives the product for free to the individual in need in the
￿rst period and if the monopoly prices at p = r = z in the second period, the
consumer believes that the kindness of the monopoly is the following:
g fMk =
(c ￿ z)=2 + (1=2 + vi=2)(x ￿ x=2)
￿ ￿ c + (1=2 + vi=2)(x ￿ 0)
(3)
where vi is the relation between the consumer and the individual in need. I
assume that the consumer does not have any special reason to be kind to the
19monopoly, like if the owner of the monopoly and the consumer belong to the
same group, and therefore I assume that vj = 0. If the monopoly does not give
the product for free to the individual in need in the ￿rst period the consumer
believes that the kindness of the monopoly is the following:
^ fMNk =
(c ￿ z)=2 + (1=2 + vi=2)(0 ￿ x=2)
￿ ￿ c + (1=2 + vi=2)(x ￿ 0)
If the consumer buys the product from the monopoly, at a price lower than
his valuation, he would not been kind to the monopoly, given that he is doing an
action that improves his own material payo⁄s. However, if he does not buy the
product (by choosing a reservation price higher than the price of the monopoly)
he would been unkind, given that he is sacri￿cing his material payo⁄s in order
to punish the monopoly. The consumer￿ s utility from consuming a product from
the monopoly if it gives to the individual in need is given by:
Uc = ￿ ￿ z + g fMk(1 + 0)
and the consumer￿ s utility from consuming a product from the monopoly if
it does not give to the individual in need is given by:
Uc = ￿ ￿ z + ^ fMNk (1 + 0)
If the consumer do not buy the product of a monopoly that has given to the
individual in need then their utility would be given by:
Uc = 0 + ^ fMNk (1 ￿ 1) = 0
In the second period, the monopoly charges a price that makes indi⁄erent
the consumer between consuming and not consuming. The maximum price the
monopoly is able to charge without the consumers be willing to retaliate is:
p =
2￿
2 ￿ 2￿c + c + (1=2 + vi=2)x(2￿ + 1)
1 + 2￿ ￿ 2c + 2(1=2 + vi=2)x
and if the monopoly does not give to the individual in need, the maximum
price that the monopoly is able to charge is:
p =
2￿
2 ￿ 2￿c + c ￿ (1=2 + vi=2)x(2￿ + 1)
1 + 2￿ ￿ 2c + 2(1=2 + vi=2)x
20and therefore the monopoly is able to increase its price if it gives the product
for free to the individual in need. If the cost of donating the product to the
consumer in need is lower than the extra revenue it brings, that is, if c <
(1=2+vi=2)x(2￿+1)
1+2￿￿2c+2(1=2+vi=2)x; the monopoly will give the product for free.
We have to note that the price the consumer is willing to pay can be higher
than his valuation of the product. If (1=2+vi=2)(x￿x=2) > (c￿z)=2; equation
1 is higher than zero, and therefore the consumer thinks that the monopoly
not only is kind to the individual in need, but overall is kind. In this case,
individuals would be willing to pay a higher price than their valuation of the
product in order to be kind in response to the monopoly. For example, many
people buy the cookies that are sold by the girl scouts at a higher price than
their valuation of the cookies because they want to help the organization as
much as they want to eat the cookies.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I introduced to game theory the emotions of fairness between
groups by extending Matthew Rabin￿ s model of fairness equilibrium to groups
of individuals. There is a number of possible extensions to this work. First, in
the real world the majority of interactions is repeated and therefore, a repeated
game version of group fairness would bring new and more realistic results. In
international relations, countries construct their relations little by little, increas-
ing their trust with kind actions over time. It is reasonable to think that if an
individual or a group of individuals are kind or unkind once and again and
again, the feeling of kindness or unkindness would grow larger over time. It will
be interesting to extend my model by de￿ning a function of kindness that can
increase or decrease over time. I believe that by doing this, group fairness would
help reduce the large set of possible equilibria that exists in repeated games.
Second, I believe that group fairness can be very useful to help explain
other phenomena of group interactions. For example: a) hatred between ethnic
groups due to a con￿ ict, b) nationalism, where individuals treat better ￿rms
or individuals from their own country, and c) charity, where it is observed that
individuals donate more money to the groups they belong.
Third, in this paper I assumed the value of vi (the closeness of the members
of a group) to be ￿xed. However, the closenest to the members of a group
21depends on the actions and intentions of the members toward each other and
the actions and intentions of other individuals toward the members of the group.
For example, if the members of a family are unkind toward each other, we should
not expect it to be as close as a family whose member are kind toward each other.
And it has been observed that unkindness toward the members of a group tend
to bring them toghether. Extending my model by endogeneizing the closeness
of groups would help explainning many phenomena like the increase of religion
fervor or nationalism after wars or intherethnic con￿ icts.
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228 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
For contradiction: If (ai;aj) is a fairness equilibria that is not a Nash equilib-
ria, then there is another strategy that gives higher material payo⁄s to at least
one player. If X grows arbitrarily large, then these material di⁄erence would
grow arbitrarily large and would dominate any material payo⁄s. Therefore, at
least one player would deviate and (ai;aj) cannot be a fairness equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 2
As X increases arbitrarily, the material payo⁄s increase. However, the fair-
ness payo⁄s are independent of X and therefore eventually the material payo⁄s
dominate the fairness payo⁄s and the fairness equilibrium becomes the Nash
equilibrium. Because players are maximizing their own material payo⁄s and the
other individual would not think that they are being kind. Therefore there is
not a positive fairness equilibrium.
As X becomes large, individuals would play a Nash equilibrium. If the Nash
equilibrium is not mutual-max outcome, then at least one individual is playing
a strategy that is not maximizing the other utility and therefore he is unkind
to him. By Rabin￿ s proposition 1, the other individual also would be unkind
to him (at least weakly) and the equilibrium would be weakly negative fairness
equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 3
This is the same proof of Rabin￿ s proposition 5, but extended for group
fairness. Group-fairness gains or losses are independent of X: However, material
payo⁄s are proportional to X and as X becomes large, the di⁄erence between
the equilibrium strategies and the non equilibrium strategies becomes large.
Therefore, as X grows arbitrarily large, group fairness gains or losses become
unimportant with respect to the material payo⁄s and the strategies A becomes
a strict best reply.
If A is not a Nash equilibrium then there is at least one other strategy that
improves the material payo⁄s for at least one player. As X becomes arbitrarily
large the material payo⁄s eventually dominate the group fairness payo⁄s and
another strategy eventually improves for at least one player with respect to A.
Proof of proposition 4
23As X becomes large, the group-equilibrium for each game are Nash equi-
librium and therefore each individual is maximizing their own payo⁄. This
eliminates that other individuals think that their are kind to them and their
group
Proof of proposition 5
Proposition 5 is a direct translation of Rabin￿ s proposition 3 As X ! 0; the
material payo⁄s goes to zero and it is dominated by the group fairness payo⁄s.
If the outcome is strictly mutual-max for both games then both players are
being kind to the players of the other group and therefore they are maximizing
the group fairness payo⁄s and it is a group-fairness equilibrium. If the outcome
is strictly mutual-min for both games then both players are being unkind to the
players of the other group and therefore they are maximizing the group fairness
payo⁄s and therefore it is a group-fairness equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 6
If the game has a strict Nash equilibrium it would become part of the group-
fairness as X grows arbitrarily large. Because it is a mutual-max outcome, then
it is maximizing each other outcomes and therefore it is not being unkind to
them. But because they are maximizing each other payo⁄s they are neither
been kind to each other. Therefore the fairness of game two is zero and the
group-fairness of the whole game is de￿ned by game one.
As Y becomes large, the group fairness equilibrium of the game is a Nash
equilibrium for game 2 by proposition 1. Because the Nash equilibrium is not
a mutual-max outcome, then at least one of the players is not maximizing the
other players material payo⁄s and then he is being unfair to him. By Rabin￿ s
proposition 2 we know that fairness equilibria are symmetric and that the other
player will be unfair in response (at least weekly unfair). As Y becomes large
with respect to X, the unfairness of game 2 dominates over any result in game
1 and the group-fairness becomes weakly negative.
Proof of proposition 7
As Y becomes small, the material payo⁄s of game 1 dominate equation 1.
As the material payo⁄s of game 2 approach zero, the group fairness of the game
is proportional to the fairness equilibria for game 1.
248.1 Appendix B
In this appendix I extend the de￿nition of group fairness to more than two
games and four players.
I assume that individuals think that the kindness of other individuals is
simply the average of how kind these individuals are with other individuals
they play with (including himself). For this, I de￿ne a variable Kindnessi
j that
represent the overall perception of kindness of individual j from the point of










Additionally, individuals tend to form a⁄ective emotions from groups which
members have been kind or unkind. I model this by assuming that individuals
think that the kindness of a group is the average of the kindness they observe











I normalize this by dividing over the di⁄erence between the average of the






































where hij is a positive constant when i and j belong to the same group,
zero otherwise. hij allows me to represent individuals￿preference to help other
individuals of their own group. vi is a parameter that represents how important
is the behavior of the members other group for individual i (likely depends on
factors such as the level of education). I limit the size of hij to be no greater
than one.
25Once I have completed the de￿nition of the kindness functions I can de￿ne
an individual￿ s utility function when he plays with another individual:
Uij = ￿ij + ￿
i
j(1 + fij)
Given that an individual can have interaction with more than one player,






De￿nition 4: The strategies aij 2 Sij for all i;j 2 N; where i 6= j are a
Group Fairness Equilibrium if:
1) aij 2 argmaxaij2Sij Ui
2) aij = bk
ij = ck
ij
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